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The Idea of Deep Surfaces in Cultural Studies
Laurie Johnson, University of Southern Queensland, QLD, Australia
Abstract: This paper argues that Cultural Studies has tended in the past to arrive inevitably at a methodological impasse
by failing to adequately theorise the status of the object of a “cultural” study. The same problem can be identified when
culture is theorised (in terms of the so-called Structure-Agency debate) in Anthropology, which would seem to be the obvious
point of contact for any interdisciplinary approach to a study of culture. The paper suggests that a dialogue with Psycho-
analysis may provide scholars of Cultural Studies with a way to move beyond this impasse. Using basic psychoanalytical
theory, it is possible to see that the issue of whether an object is ultimately a product of either deep structures (a cultural
process) or an agent (an individual making a thing) remains unresolved while the status of the object remains locked in
what I am calling an archaeological paradigm. Using psychoanalytical theory, I propose that the object of Cultural Studies
can be seen as an example of a “deep surface” rather than as a deep structure, in order to begin to identify the ways in
which deep structures come to be manifest as a result of an individual act of production.
Keywords: Agency, Anthropology, Cultural Studies, Heuristics, Psychoanalysis, Structure, Structure-Agency Debate, Thick
Description
THIS PAPER SEEKS to pave the way forfuture dialogue between Psychoanalysis andthe myriad strands of practice that, taken
collectively, carry the name Cultural Studies.
Dialogue is needed in order for Cultural Studies
practitioners to move beyond an impasse at which,
in my view, they now arrive inevitably in ‘doing’
cultural theory. In what follows, I shall explain how
this impasse emerges in such inevitable fashion along
the lines of the so-called Structure-Agency debate,
but I will explore the possibility that Psychoanalysis
provides a viable solution to the problem. In short,
I propose that where Cultural Studies has convention-
ally found purchase in the idea of deep structures
beneath the surface of cultural production, which
inevitably leads to the impasse that I am describing,
Psychoanalysis provides a conceptual arsenal that
enables us to understand how structures are embed-
ded in what I call the ‘deep surface’ of cultural pro-
duction. I will explain that this solution requires not
simply taking psychoanalytic concepts or models
and inserting them into existing frameworks. The
onus must be on establishing a genuine dialogue,
exchanging ideas, and learning key lessons from the
practice of Psychoanalysis as much as from abstract
metapsychological writings.
Of course, wemust dispel at the outset any sugges-
tion that there is likely to be widespread resistance
to a dialogue of this kind. Indeed, the study of the
mind has never been far from theminds of those who
seek to define the machinations of culture. As Clif-
ford Geertz notes in ‘Culture, Mind, Brain / Brain,
Mind, Culture,’ transgressions of the boundaries
between Anthropology and Psychology go back as
far as when Edward Tylor first defined culture in the
1870s, while reflecting on the ‘cognitive insufficien-
cies of primitive religion’ (Geertz, Available Light
204). Geertz is himself a chief proponent and expo-
nent par excellence of the blurring of disciplinary
boundaries from within Anthropology. Yet we must
not presume that Cultural Studies is synonymous
with Anthropology. As suggested in the opening
paragraph, Cultural Studies is being viewed here as
a disparate set of practices, many of which show
little evidence of commonality in any disciplinary
sense. Simon During’s brief history, in his introduc-
tion to The Cultural Studies Reader, accounts for the
way in which the field has long been in continual
flux, ‘shifting its interests and methods both because
it is in constant and engaged interaction with its lar-
ger historical context and because it cannot be com-
placent about its authority’ (17). During’s point is
that for all of its many faces, Cultural Studies has
most often reflected a desire to give legitimacy to
the study of those cultural practices that have been
previously either marginalised (as minority or ‘mass’
culture) or ignored outright. In this sense, Cultural
Studies shifts interests and methods as the rules of
engagement shift in the ongoing battle to give
valence to the disempowered. Thus, we get a picture
of the history of Cultural Studies as at first being in-
formed by Leavisite literary studies, then by
Althusserian critiques of ideology, then by sociology,
semiotics, social semiotics and so on. What this his-
tory seems to suggest is that what all practitioners
of Cultural Studies share is a propensity for borrow-
ing from other disciplines for the purpose of continu-
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ally reinventing ‘cultural studies’ as a kind of per-
petually revisionist arm of Literary Theory.
If Cultural Studies fails to resemble a coherent
disciplinary organisation of concepts, methods and
objects of study, the problem is exacerbated, as
During points out, by a ‘cultural turn’ in the majority
of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences,
and that much of the work done by anthropologists,
geographers, historians, literary critics, sociologists
and others is lumped together by publishers and
booksellers under the catch-all rubric of ‘cultural
studies’ (During 23-26). Against this seeming prolif-
eration, During stresses the need for practitioners to
define their method as a ‘discrete mode of analysis
… which, for convenience’s sake, I’ll call “engaged
cultural studies”’ (24). Even in attempting to lend
clarity to the task at hand, During cannot but be
drawn into the empty proliferation of the key terms:
to define Cultural Studies, I shall refer to ‘engaged’
cultural studies. Yet all is not lost. By describing
engaged cultural studies as a ‘mode of analysis,’
During participates in a language that is identifiably
aligned with Literary Theory. The term ‘analysis’
refers in this context to a critical reading that de-
scribes both the structure and content of a text. It is
worth noting at this point that analysis as it is under-
stood in Literary Theory should not in any way be
seen as coterminous with the practice of psycho-
analysis and should never entertain pretensions to
that effect. Psychoanalysis is of course a specific set
of strategies for negotiating the engagement between
analyst and analysand for the purposes of treating
psychical dysfunction. The mistake made by many
literary critics in the past has been to see the text or
characters within a text as a viable substitute for an
analysand. Analysis as it is understood by During in
this definition of Cultural Studies refers instead to a
practice that treats its object as object rather than as
the putative co-participant in an intersubjective rela-
tion. Cultural Studies is thus a ‘discrete mode’ of
reading, the lineaments of which can be compared
to what otherwise normally passes for literary
scholarship, but the comparison – the basis for
framing a discreteness of the mode – comes down
ultimately to the type of object involved. Here, then,
is the crux of the matter. Since so many different
types of objects have become the focus of the many
different types of scholarship called Cultural Studies,
blanket definitions of the field tend to narrow in on
similarities in method alone.
Attempts to define Cultural Studies rarely draw
on any systematic or sustained elaboration of the
thing itself – ‘culture’ – which lends to the field its
name. I think this is in part due to the fact that so
many of the leading practitioners, from Leavisite
critics onward, have had their academic training in
literary scholarship. The use of the term ‘cultural’
merely serves as a designator for a mode of analysis
set apart from ‘literary’ studies by virtue of having
as its specific object a non-literary kind of text. Ulti-
mately, the practitioner of Cultural Studies is still
‘doing’ textual analysis. Another reason for the ab-
sence of any sustained elaboration of what is under-
stood by the term ‘culture’ within Cultural Studies
may indeed be the kind of sensitivity to disciplinary
borderlines which During lists as a factor in the
field’s metamorphoses. As a mode of analysis, he
observes, Cultural Studies represents less a discipline
than ‘a field within multidisciplinarity’ (27) capable
of being transported from one discipline to another,
although this more often than not manifests as bor-
rowing from one discipline after another rather than
genuine intervention. As habitual border hoppers,
practitioners of Cultural Studies will be aware that
the obvious source fromwhich to borrow a definition
of ‘culture’ – Anthropology – has itself been a locus
for the blurring of disciplinary boundaries for much
of the past three decades. Even within Anthropology,
the definition of culture has itself been under review
on the basis of rethinking occasioned by an exchange
of ideas with literary scholarship.
To give an example of this, in a gesture that is
typical of the self-reflexive turn in interpretive an-
thropology during the past three decades, James
Clifford once described cultures as ‘ethnographic
collections’ (230). Clifford’s point is partly figurat-
ive, but also partly literal. The point works by high-
lighting the idea that the cultures described by ethno-
graphers only exist as suchwithin the ethnographers’
descriptions. Ethnographers are thus like collectors
because ethnography (writing about the culture) is
a strategic and very selective assignment in which
‘diverse experiences and facts are selected, gathered,
detached from their original temporal occasions, and
given enduring value in a new arrangement’ (Clifford
231). Such admissions are, as I indicated, typical
among the writings of that generation of anthropolo-
gists, like Clifford Geertz, for whom questions of
methodology became synonymous with issues of
ethnographic authority, representation, subjectivity,
and textuality, giving rise to an interest in the theor-
etical work being done by literature scholars. Yet for
David Chioni Moore, the preponderance of material
on these subjects has, ad nauseum, led to the emer-
gence of a discourse he calls ‘anthro-apology’ (354).
The concern for Moore is that ethnographers can
become so conscious of writing about culture that
they begin to resemble a little too much the literature
scholars from whom they borrow these concerns.
Yet Clifford’s observation suggests already that an-
thropological navel gazing involvesmore than reflec-
tion upon the plight of anthropologists in their role
as authors. Certainly, much has been written on the
subject, following the lead provided by Geertz in his
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perennial attempt to blur boundaries between anthro-
pology and literary theory. Yet if Clifford’s ‘culture
collectors’ construct the cultures they purport to
study, it is not simply in the extent to which they are
the authors of the worlds described in their fieldnotes
and published works.
This is therefore the degree to which we should
take Clifford’s point literally: anthropologists collect
tangible material evidence of their encounter with
another world. Objects granted the status of artefact
provide a supposedly stable point of reference as the
correlation between the subjective realm of the
fieldnote and the world of things. I say ‘supposedly’:
just as he focuses on some different aspect of anthro-
pological practice, Clifford is drawn toward an ad-
mission that would no doubt drive dissenters like
Moore to distraction. He notes that even in the act
of gathering, an anthropologist makes value judge-
ments based on a grand narrative of historical decay,
with the simple act of gathering fashioned in the
mind of the practitioner as the ‘rescue of phenomena’
to give ‘form, structure and continuity to a world’
(231). This is to say even culture collecting is, a
fortiori, storytelling. Against this teleological narrat-
ive of decay and preservation, Clifford notes that a
different type of narrative is brought into play by the
ethnographer: a chronotope (231). The term is taken,
not surprisingly, from Literary Theory, as it was de-
vised by the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin to
designate the fictionalised location in time and space
that functions as a ‘setting’ in which certain kinds
of stories such as a novel can be enacted. In a literary
narrative, a chronotope creates the illusion that the
events and characters described possess a corporeal
reality. For Clifford, in an ethnographic text, a
chronotope functions as an index of reality but liter-
ally in the sense of there having been a here and now
to the anthropological encounter. Artefacts add a
sense of concreteness to the immediacy of the chro-
notope: artefact and chronotope are blended in what
might be called the phantasy of a stable point of
reference beyond the text.
In this way, I suggest, ethnographic practice is the
expression of a desire for an external point of refer-
ence. Clifford himself points out that attempts to
define the term culture in any general sense always
ultimately run hard up against the ‘need to be able
to speak holistically of Japanese or Trobriand or
Moroccan culture in the confidence that we are des-
ignating something real and differentially coherent’
(230). We arrive, therefore, at a kind of impasse in
which a desire for an external point of reference is
only ever prolonged but never gratified. An ethno-
graphic text holds out for the promise of ‘a culture’
that lies beyond description, yet always defers real-
isation by delivering a hollow shell, a representation,
in its stead. Does this mean Anthropology’s self-re-
flexive turn has exposed this discipline’s own contra-
dictions, and that what Moore calls anthro-apology
is thus the lament of those whose own life’s work
has ultimately been revealed (by themselves) to be
empty? If such a statement holds true, then what
hope the Cultural Studies scholar who seeks to bor-
row a stable catch-all referent – ‘culture’ – to posit
as the marker of a particular kind of text capable of
being subjected to sustained scrutiny?
Expressed in these terms, the obstacles may seem
insurmountable, hence the suggestion that we arrive
inevitably at an impasse. Yet I contend that the value
of reflexive anthropology has been in foregrounding
the difficulties associated with attempting to study
(therefore, to represent) what is ostensibly nothing
less than the condition of representation. Clifford’s
definition of culture as ethnographic collections
provides one perspective on this issue. Geertz’s
seminal Interpretation of Cultures provides another,
not surprisingly borrowing from elsewhere in order
to elaborate his most significant methodological
claim. Geertz reiterates one of Gilbert Ryle’s thought
experiments: how do we know when a wink is not a
wink and merely a twitch and when it is something
else altogether, such as a fake-wink, a burlesque-
fake-wink and so on (7)? The experiment was inven-
ted by Ryle in order to demonstrate the degree to
which human actions are inflected with depth in in-
tention, volition, context and circumstance which
are not always contained in a simple account of the
act itself. Thick description, rather than thin, is
needed to account for these depths. Yet this is as far
as Ryle’s invented example takes the point, since it
is enough to argue that depth is realised in the level
of description. For Geertz, the interpretation of cul-
ture is as much about the relative depth of the thing
itself as it is about the complexity of the descriptions
by the anthropologist. What Geertz did with Ryle’s
experiment was to incorporate it into a structuralist
view of cultural formations. To simplify the differ-
ence between the two, I will say that for Ryle the
distinction between a twitch and a wink rests in the
‘shared’ meaning held by two or more individuals;
for Geertz, the distinction is determined by the system
of meanings that govern behaviour in a particular
place and time. For Ryle, the distinction is at best
semiotic, whereas for Geertz it is cultural, by which
he means it functions at the level of deep structure.
This also marks a point at which Clifford and Geertz
part company, for the former maintains that cultures
(representations) are principally constructed on the
side of the observer, while the latter maintains that
culture (deep structure) determines first and foremost
what can and cannot be observed. Both, however,
share a passing concern with the role of interpretation
in giving form to observation.
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The approaches of Clifford and Geertz, two of the
principal protagonists of an interpretive Anthropo-
logy in the last thirty years, are thus markedly differ-
ent, yet the terms with which we have identified this
difference also enable us to mark out a common do-
main. Both are concerned with upsetting traditional
anthropological relations between observers and
observed phenomena, with interpretation as the
pivotal term unhinging the relation. Clifford’s stance
is that interpretation always mediates between the
observer and cultural phenomena, leading him to
conclude that a designation of phenomena as ‘cultur-
al’ is an observer’s prerogative. Geertz also sees in-
terpretation as an intermediary, yet he concludes that
this points to a structure of meaning beyond cultural
phenomena. In both views, of course, the anthropo-
logist-cum-collector-cum-author still occupies the
position of an observer observing phenomena from
beyond. This brings me to a key point here: because
interpretation is cast here as the intermediary between
observer and observed, it reveals itself as principally
heuristic, as if the final goal of cultural studies is to
determine what its object is. In order to do this, it
needs its object to be relatively fixed and therefore
capable of being observed. For this reason, I suggest
that the anthropological encounter as imagined in
the work of Clifford, Geertz and their colleagues
adheres primarily to what I loosely call an ‘archae-
ological’ paradigm. Reduced to its most fundamental
level, this paradigm refers to the synechdocic process
by which an observer identifies patterns in pots and
spearheads and other miscellaneous objects, which,
as artefacts, then come to stand in for a presumed
collective totality – a culture.
John Barrett points out that the discipline of Ar-
chaeology has been trying to overcome just such a
deterministic bias for the past twenty years. Against
the assumption that the primary goal of Archaeology
is to generalise ‘in terms of large-scale spatial regu-
larities’ and ‘long-term historical trends’ (143),
Barrett observes that during the 1980s archaeologists
began concerning themselves with questions of
agency. He notes also, however, that the concern
with agency has still involved mapping the role of
agents in shaping or transforming large-scale pat-
terns, and he concludes with a renewed call to aban-
don the structuralist focus on parts and wholes: ‘The
social totality,’ he insists, ‘should not form the basic
domain or unit of archaeological study’ (155). The
difficulty is in finding a way of making sense of in-
dividual practice in terms of a ‘field of productive
relations’ rather than ‘the isolated presence of an in-
dividual’s experience’ (158). Ultimately, Barrett
imagines that Archaeology must break free from its
own limitations by adopting the idea of a social sys-
tem, rather than a social totality, from sociological
theory, a la Anthony Giddens.
Barrett’s terms are interesting, and we can reflect
on them here as instructive of the difficulty confron-
ted by cultural theorists, this impasse to which I have
been referring. The status of the artefact within this
paradigm is indicative, shall we say, of things having
beenmade, where the passive voice is in the ascend-
ancy. Even Geertz’s Balinese cockfighters, his own
example of thick description, are evidence that
something has been made – in this case, meaning,
but as I said it is not so much meaning shared as it
is meaning structured. The artefact is held to signify
only that a structure of signification exists before it.
‘Things having been made’ points toward a different
generalisation but a generalisation nonetheless: rather
than a structure of signification, this is the field of
productive relations. The idea that somebody made
these things is an unnecessary – indeed, unwelcome
– complication, as Barrett suggests when he recog-
nises the difficulty posed by the presence of the indi-
vidual. Here, then, is the crucial sticking point around
which the impasse takes shape: observed phenomena
are held to be representative rather than representa-
tions in their own right. Representation, as we have
seen, is a part of the ethnographic exercise, as pro-
duced by the ethnographer. What is needed, I sug-
gest, is for the observer to become somewhatmyopic,
concentrating attention at first on the individual. I
emphasise ‘at first,’ since I maintain that we should
not discard the existing paradigm; merely that we
should enrich it. My point is that descriptions of
cultural phenomena can become thicker still by tak-
ing into account the highly concentrated field of an
individual practice within which meanings and ob-
jects are generated. This does not mean that we can
only understand cultural phenomena if we know
precisely who it was that made it; rather, it means
that we must at least be prepared to recognise in the
object or observed phenomena the fact of having
been produced by somebody, and that this somebody
is capable of being understood in terms of a psycho-
logical depth, rather than as the top layer of a system
or structure shaping human practices from beyond.
The goal, to which I believe Psychoanalysis is
uniquely positioned to contribute, is to understand
how such systems and structures are generated by
human agency.
Why is Psychoanalysis so well positioned to do
this? The answer lies in the status it attributes to its
principal object and in its method. As R.H.Hook
states the case in a fundamental form, Psychoanalysis
sets itself apart from other disciplines even within
Psychology in the extent to which its methods and
theories refer at all times to that which is unconscious
and which therefore ‘cannot be conceptualised other-
wise than by inference from its known and observ-
able consequences’ (117). As we have seen, the study
of culture also conceptualises its object principally
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by inference from observed phenomena, interpreted
as the known consequences of a deep structure. At
the risk of making too much of such a similarity, I
would like to use it as a starting point for fashioning
the dialogue between psychoanalysis and Cultural
Studies. The important point to be made here is that
both Psychoanalysis and the study of culture rely on
interpretation as a way of managing what amounts
to a constitutive gap in knowledge, the void each
aims to fill. In the study of culture, we this leads to
an impasse. Where I think Psychoanalysis provides
a way beyond the impasse is in that crucial clinical
function to which psychoanalytical knowledge is
put. Psychoanalytical interpretation is not held to be
the convenient pivot between an observer and an
observed phenomena or thing. Interpretation inter-
cedes only within the fact of the intersubjective rela-
tion between analyst and analysand, both of whom
are autonomous meaning making agents. As Hook
points out, citing Wilfred Bion, the analytic proced-
ure is not concerned ultimately with knowing the
content of the unconscious – it deems this unknow-
able from the outset – since all that can be known of
the unconscious are the transformations the ‘thing
in itself’ undergoes (117). Hook adds in parentheses
that another word for these transformations is ‘rep-
resentation,’ and it is on this point that I want now
to focus.
I noted that the anthropological impasse inhered
in the treatment of individual objects as representat-
ive, rather than as representations. Hook’s point
brings us closer to seeing how the treatment of cul-
ture as representation shifts not only the locus of
production (from a field of relations to an individual
agent) but also the causal relation between structure
and agency. If on the other side of the object we
posit an autonomous meaning making agent, rather
than an independently deep structure, we restore to
the object its status as a representation. Yet armed
with Hook’s point about the transformations of the
unconscious being otherwise viably known as repres-
entations, we need not think of representation purely
in terms of an authorial intention, for example. Inter-
pretation ofwhat the object represents can and should
go beyond what the maker intends, and can include
the metastases of a maker’s unconscious. This does
not yet mean that we have addressed the issue of
how the deep structures identified by the cultural
scholar are generated by a human agent. Neverthe-
less, we have put the first stone down in paving the
path along this royal road. If we accept that these
structures are expressed in some way within the ob-
ject, rather than being imposed by the observer, then
the introduction of the human agent into the formula
of cultural production suggests also that these struc-
tures are somehow put there by the agent. The most
obvious mistake that the cultural scholar can now
make is to assume that agency presupposes a con-
scious decision to impose one’s will upon something.
Here Psychoanalysis can provide significant assist-
ance.
The lesson that Psychoanalysis has long been
teaching Literary Theory can be carried over to cul-
tural texts: any act (of communication, of production)
carries with it a number of unconscious effects that
exceed the intentions of the agent. It is my suspicion
that the deep structures identified by the cultural
scholar are a residue in the object of a particular kind
of unconscious effect. This is why I feel that dialogue
is necessary, rather moreso than borrowing from
Psychoanalysis for the benefit of answering a
conundrum for Cultural Studies. Through this dia-
logue, cultural scholars should be able to gain
greater insight into the nature of what has previously
been understood as deep structure. Of reciprocal be-
nefit may be the identification of a specific cultural
function of unconscious processes, although any
claim on my part about the value of such a dialogue
for psychoanalysts is clearly more speculative than
my comments about the benefits to Cultural Studies.
To conclude, then, I will simply provide a glimpse
of where this dialogue might proceed in terms of
Cultural Studies.
Theories pertaining to ego formation describe the
process by which our sense of our self as a functional
and functioning human being hinges upon a relatively
stable – yet always so easily shattered – self-image
which is nothing less than a projection of the physical
surface of our bodies as the limit of the psyche. These
ideas mean, in other words, that ego formation is
representational, which is to say that the ego emerges
as a result of our representation of oneself to oneself.
A function of ego formation is to maintain the
boundary between the interior and the exterior of our
self, this ‘skin ego,’ as Didier Anzieu called it. In a
special edition of The International Journal of Crit-
ical Psychology in 2002, I attempted to draw on these
ideas to pin down a definition of a term that had be-
gun proliferating in critical parlance in the 1990s:
embodiment 1. I defined embodiment in that essay
as ‘the ways in which the unconscious posits its own
exterior’ (53). I want to extend that definition here
by suggesting that from a psychoanalytic standpoint
agency and embodiment are two functions of the
process of establishing andmaintaining the boundary
between the interior and the exterior of the uncon-
scious.We are embodied by virtue of positing a sense
of exteriority beyond the limit represented by our
bodies, and we possess agency by virtue of confirm-
ing the capacity of our bodies to engage with this
1 This article was also the subject of my essay, “Ill-disciplined (Bodies of Thought)”, published in the International Journal of Interdiscip-
linary Social Sciences in 2007.
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exterior world. Agency is thus always inflected as a
projection of the inner self onto the exterior of the
self. We assume then that the projections of the ex-
terior onto the interior of the self work against
agency. Is this perhaps what Candida Yates and
Shelley Day Sclater are describing when they pro-
pose the term ‘cultural psyche’ to refer to that sense
we have of our personal subjectivity being shaped
by what seem to us to be external forces (136)?With
this term, of course, Yates and Sclater seek to bridge
the gap between structure and agency, showing that
culture is structured internally, in accordance with
the structure of the psyche, and is not imposed from
without. In order to address the impasse within Cul-
tural Studies, I think we must go further.
The notion that culture is structured in accordance
with the structure of the psyche cuts off in advance
the question of why, if cultures come from within
each of us, our cultural products show levels of uni-
formity, or patterning, enabling the cultural scholar
to interpret them as evidence of a deep structural
matrix shaping cultural production from beyond. The
notion of a cultural psyche suggests that the deep
structures evident in cultural products are the same
structures evident within both the mind of the produ-
cer and the observer. My concern is that this does
not adequately address the issue of differences
between cultures. Rather than relying on the structure
of the psyche in toto, I would like to leave open a
possibility that this cultural psyche is a representa-
tion of a deep structure. Let us never forget the lesson
of Freud’s initial attempts at a project for a scientific
psychology, in which we see the topography of the
mind coalesce around the range of core functions
(eventually defined by Freud as the Unconscious,
the Ego, the Id, and so on), but with the content of
each seen as being continually in flux. Our engage-
ment with the world does not take place in a void,
and our representations of the exterior world are
limited to some extent by the shape of this world.
As we are continually in contact with ‘cultural’ ob-
jects, then our range of possible cathexes, possible
day residues, possible repressed materials, and such
like are limited by the shape of the objects around
us.
This is also how I see a ‘cultural psyche’ function-
ing. Our sense of our self, and our modes of engage-
ment in the world – that is to say, our embodiment
and our agency – are delimited to a great extent by
the world as we perceive it, and this in turn shapes
how each of us project ourselves back into this world,
through our ‘cultural’ products. Culture is no longer
conceived here as deep structure, on the other side
of the object; rather, it is what I would call the ‘deep
surface’ of the object. Our actions (as agents) in the
world serve to remind us of the exteriority of this
world, yet this is an exteriority always posited, al-
ways negotiated and revised in order to protect our
sense of our own fundamental interiority; accord-
ingly, the deep structures that we find (as cultural
scholars) in the objects produced by these actions
are already projected as possessing the quality of a
structure out there, beyond us, yet seeming also to
act through us since it is patently apparent here in
what we make, these ‘cultural’ products. Deep
structures are thus projected onto objects, as onto
the surfaces of our own bodies, as a part of the way
we shape our reality. This is to say that surface – the
surface of the object and the surface of my body –
is itself always being renegotiated in the process of
maintaining a sense of self. The depth we presume
to be on the other side of these surfaces is a necessary
formation in order to create the illusion of perman-
ence; that is, to fix our sense of who we are in rela-
tion to the world around us. Yet this depth emerges
only in the positing of a surface, and must therefore
be continually instantiated anew, time after time, in
every version of a surface that we produce.
If dialogue between Psychoanalysis and Cultural
Studies can produce a more nuanced and ‘deep’
model of cultural production along these lines, the
challenge that lies before practitioners of Cultural
Studies will of course be to embed these ideas in
their discrete modes of analysis, as During described
it. Yet for dialogue to be truly open-ended, these
modes of analysis may indeed require a less discrete
approach. Again, I will emphasise that I do not see
this as an invitation to adopt a directly psychoanalyt-
ical mode of inquiry in relation to cultural objects:
we do not seek to treat the objects of Cultural Studies
after the manner of a patient in the clinic. Yet the
idea of deep surfaces demands a mode of analysis
that recognises both agents and structures as
comingled in a process that does not originate in any
ontological sense with either, but also as equally
plausible subjects of inquiry in a heuristic sense; that
is, as viable explanations for the origins of an object.
A goal of an analysis of deep surfaces will, therefore,
be to refuse to countenance mutual exclusion of
agency and structure as determinants in the shape of
cultures and the objects through which we seek to
‘read’ culture.
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